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1. Introduction 
The external environment in which universities carry out their activities has changed 
substantially in the last century. A historical milestone in this change was the publishing 
of Bush’s report in 1945. The fundamental principle of Bush’s report was simple: basic 
research discoveries will be converted via technology transfer to become powerful drivers 
of economic development and social welfare. Afterward, the mission of universities  
was no longer limited to teaching; in addition they must research (Valls and Condom, 
2003). 
More recently, as a consequence of a set of reforms targeted to improve the transfer of 
research results to industry, a reconceptualization of the universities’ role started during 
the 1980s. In the U.S., Bayh-Dole Act allowed universities to own patents resulting from 
federal research money. Starting from early 1990s, structural changes in the external 
environment of European universities pushed them for a more proactive role in 
technology transfer, too (Baldini et al., 2006). As a result, universities currently have to 
meet the social and economic needs of society. Therefore, the mission of universities is no 
longer limited to research and training (Branscomb et al., 1999; Etzkowitz et al., 2000); in 
addition, they must also contribute to the economic growth of the regions where they are 
located (the “third” mission). This new phenomenon emerged from the “second 
revolution” has been labelled “The Entrepreneurial University” (Ertkowitz et al., 2000) or 
“Academic entrepreneurship”. 
What is an entrepreneurial University? The term was practically coined with the publication 
of Clark’s work (1998), Creating entrepreneurial universities organizational pathways of 
transformation. In order to define an entrepreneurial university, the author analyse the 
experience of five European universities which have adopted organizational and functional 
criteria similar to private companies. Clark (1998) identifies a set of characteristics necessary 
for the success of the entrepreneurial activities: 1) managers with the authority to make 
decisions, 2) developed potential partners (industry and government), 3) a diversified 
financial base to guarantee independence, 4) motivated academics’ groups, and 5) an 
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entrepreneurial culture that demands continual internal renewal in order to adapt to 
changes in external relations. 
According to Etzkowitz (2004), the academic entrepreneurship can be expressed in a set of 
inter-related propositions: 1) the capitalization of knowledge becomes the basis for 
economic and social development and, thus, of an enhanced role for the university in 
society, 2) the interaction with the government and industry, what Etzkowitz et al. (2000) 
call the “triple helix” model, 3) the university independence, 4) the creation of hybrid 
organizational formats that incorporate business sector practices (managerialism) and those 
of “traditional” universities, and 5) the continuing renovation of the university’s internal 
structure as its relationship to the industry and government changes. 
On the other hand, several authors have outlined the perils of misunderstanding the 
university entrepreneurial activity. Industry may excessively intervene in the university 
activities, leading academics to “academic capitalism” (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997) and 
“McUniversities” (Hayes and Wynyard, 2002). Society and academics may confuse an 
entrepreneurial university with a “for-profit university”. Zemsky et al. (2005) emphasize the 
importance of the university’s teaching function, encouraging universities to “move learning 
to the center of the teaching enterprise” (Zemsky et al. 2005, p.9). The excessive industry’s 
intervention may also generate interest conflicts among universities and their members. In 
addition, the university services created to improve the transfer of research results to 
industry come at a high cost and require much maintenance. 
Despite these perils and the lack of a consensus definition, the academic entrepreneurship 
adds another mission to the university’ traditional list (research and teaching); the economic 
and social development of the geographic area it is immersed in. There are a very wide 
range of university-industry interactions which may contribute to carry out this 
entrepreneurial activity (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Cosh et al., 2006; Hughes, 2007; 
Lester, 2005): informal contacts, recruitment of graduates, use of publications, collaborative 
research, faculty consulting, attending conferences, patenting and licensing, and new 
business formation around university science and technology (spin-offs). 
Although founding a new company is only one of a number of mechanisms for the transfer 
of knowledge from universities to industry, this choice has been growing in importance 
because of its recognition as an instrument for fostering local economic growth. In fact, 
recent decades have seen an increasing number of companies stemming from university-
developed technology. This phenomenon is more evident in the U.S. (Carayannis et al., 
1998; Degroof and Roberts, 2004) and in some European countries like the U.K. (Shane, 2004; 
Locket et al., 2003) or Sweden (Stankiewicz, 1994). 
However, several recent studies have suggested that spin-offs are not the most useful of the 
available pathways for the transfer of knowledge from universities to industry, even in the 
countries where this phenomenon is more extended. According to Lester (2005), spin-offs 
are a very small fraction (2-3%) of the total rate of new business starts in the U.S. Hughes 
(2007) also suggests that there is an overemphasis on spin offs, which may lead decision 
makers to misunderstand the nature of the technology transfer model. 
In addition, a large number of the spin-offs do not succeed in the long term because of their 
low quality (see Lambert (2003) for the British case). The features which characterise USOs 
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(small size, recent creation and innovative character) could partially explain these failure 
rates as they difficult the access to financial resources. Like Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) 
and Montañez (2006), we consider that several reasons justify an in-depth analysis. Firstly, 
USOs are a source of technology transfer, demonstrating the important role that universities 
play in the knowledge economy. Secondly, spin-offs are set up near where the knowledge 
was developed, thereby, fostering local economic growth. Thirdly, they impel changes in 
university itself by improving attitudes towards applied research and contact with the 
business community. And finally, in this way, universities and researchers can obtain long 
term financial returns.  
This paper analyzes the factors that determine the capital structure of the USOs created by 
the Spanish universities. This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, our 
work sheds light on a facet of USO decision-making that has received very little prior 
academic attention. Secondly, using information from the financial statements of the USOs, 
we have filled in one of the gaps in the empirical literature and initiated a line for future 
research. Finally, our results provide quantitative evidence of the importance of firm size, 
age and guarantees in obtaining long-term debt. With these findings in mind, the policy-
makers will be able to design policies which will make it easier for spin-offs to obtain 
appropriate financing. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the Spanish university 
environment. Section 3 describes the theoretical background of the models and outlines the 
hypotheses to be tested. In section 4, the methodology is explained. In section 5, the 
empirical results of the study are presented. Finally, we conclude by summarizing the most 
important findings, introducing the potential limitations of the research and discussing 
areas for further research and implications for policy-makers. 
2. Entrepreneurship trends in Spanish universities  
In Spain, the university system has traditionally been an example of a fully and highly 
centralized governance structure. After the restoration of democracy, the major change was 
introduced by the University Reform Act (1983). This increased the universities’ 
administrative autonomy and transferred the responsibility for universities to the seventeen 
regional governments, which have had to take care of them in financial and organizational 
matters. 
Despite these legal changes, Spanish universities have been characterized by a short 
tradition of ties with industry. In 1986, the Law of Promotion & General Coordination of 
Scientific & Technical Research (Law of Science) designed a new scientific and technological 
policy in order to face certain deficiencies of the national research system. Later, in 1988, 
the Government established the universities’ Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) to 
support and promote the dissemination of scientific knowledge and technology transfer 
activities. 
Twenty years later, Spanish universities have substantially improved their contribution to 
the national research system by increasing the activities related to the commercial 
exploitation of knowledge. For instance, the research contracts have increased considerably 
in recent years, growing from 100 million Euros in 1996 to 428 million Euros in 2006. The 
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requests of patents made in the Spanish University System have growth from the 282 
requests in 2000 to 572 in 2006. The TTOs have also played an important role in this process 
by managing about the 98% of the knowledge protection in the Spanish universities (Office 
of Technology Transfer, 2007).  
Regards to the USOs, in the Spanish University System only 18 new companies had been 
created until December 2000. From that year, the number of companies created in the 
universities has increased significantly until 2003. As shown in Figure 1, from the 39 
companies created in 2001 the number of spin-offs up to 118 in 2009 (TTOs, 2010). When we 
analyzed the rates of change in the number of spin-offs created, we found that there is a 
very significant increase in percentages above 100% at the beginning of the century. These 
rates decreased in the following years and stabilized in recent periods analyzed. 
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Graphic 1. Number of university spin-offs (2001 – 2009) 
In fact, the creation of USOs increased its importance in the Spanish University System 
because the policies and activities to promote these companies also grew. However, this 
phenomenon is not as important as in other countries, eg, U.S.A., and its impact on the 
economy is relatively low (Callan, 2001). The Spanish case is consistent with the conclusions 
of the work Fostering Entrepreneurship (OECD, 1998). This work found that the number of 
these companies does not reach the hundreds in many OECD countries. Also it found that 
most of these companies are born in a little group of universities that have a high level of 
excellence in research. Usually, these universities match up with those that spend a great 
deal of financial resources to create structures to support these technology transfer activities. 
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3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses  
Ever since Modigliani and Miller (1958) put forward their theory as to the irrelevance of 
financing decisions in the value of a company, numerous studies have attempted to 
demonstrate the existence of an optimum capital structure. Most of them focus on large and 
SMEs, however we have not found any work which analyses the factors which lie behind 
their capital structure of the USOs, although many empirical works highlight the funding 
difficulties they face.  
Therefore, we have decided to review the empirical works which analyzes the capital 
structure determinants at enterprises of similar characteristics to USOs, in particular: those 
of a small scale (SMEs) and those belonging to high-technology industries (technology-
based firms, or TBFs). In general, these works focus on three major lines of research: the 
trade-off theory, the agency theory and the pecking order theory. Drawing on these studies, 
our research presents a series of hypotheses connecting the aspects highlighted by the above 
theories with the capital structure of the Spanish USOs. Even though we contrast the 
applicability of the three research paradigms, the pecking order theory would seem to be the 
most appropriate for the case of small size and high-technology firms. 
Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses regarding the expected relationship between the 
characteristics of USOs and their capital structure. 
 
Theoretical rationales 
Dependent 
variables 
Pecking 
order theory 
Agency 
theory 
Trade-off 
theory 
H1 
Growth 
opportunities 
Total debt/ 
Long-term debt 
- - - 
Short-term debt + + + 
H2 Firm size 
Total debt/ 
Long-term debt 
+ + + 
Short-term debt - - - 
H3 Profitability 
Total debt/ 
Long-term debt 
- + + 
Short-term debt + - - 
H4 Firm age 
Total debt/ 
Long-term debt 
+ / - + - 
Short-term debt - - + 
H5 Guarantees 
Total debt/ 
Long-term debt 
+ + - 
Short-term debt - - + 
H6 Effective tax rate 
Total debt/ 
Long-term debt 
  + 
Short-term debt    
H7 
Non-debt tax 
shields 
Total debt/ 
Long-term debt 
  - 
Short-term debt    
Notes: (+ / -) Positive / negative influence on the debt level or external finance 
Table 1. Hypotheses: firm characteristics 
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Growth opportunities  
Companies with greater growth opportunities generally have a higher level of uncertainty 
as to their ultimate development, and are subjected to a greater information asymmetry. 
From the perspective of the pecking order theory, this raises the cost of external funding, 
and impedes access to finance. Consequently, those enterprises with the greatest growth 
opportunities give priority to internally generated resources over debt (Diamond, 1991). 
SMEs, and in particular USOs, are mainly subjected to conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and creditors, as the managers and owners are practically the same. According 
to Myers (1977), the under-investment problem increases at those companies with the 
greatest growth opportunities, meaning that creditors tend to reduce the funding made 
available. However, given that firms could recourse to short-term debt in order to mitigate 
the under-investment problem, some authors, such as Michaelas et al. (1999) and Sogorb-
Mira (2002) suggest a positive relationship between levels of short-term debt and growth 
opportunities.  
Those companies with the greatest growth opportunities generally have a high level of 
intangible assets, including in particular R&D expenditures and intellectual property. Since 
R&D expenditures are deductible, spin-offs with a major volume of R&D expenditures 
could be less interested in taking advantage of the tax benefits derived from the payment of 
interest on debts over the long term, and instead choose to take on a greater volume of 
short-term debt (Casasola, 2003). Similarly, a high level of intangible assets is generally 
associated with a greater probability of bankruptcy (Azofra and Fernández, 1999). For both 
reasons, from the perspective of the trade-off theory, an inverse relationship can be expected 
between growth opportunities and debt level.  
Size  
The pecking order theory states that external finance will be more expensive for smaller 
companies as they are subjected to greater information asymmetries, leading them to prefer 
internal finance and to reduce the repayment period of their debt in order to benefit from 
renegotiation. Meanwhile, larger companies present more detailed information to outsiders 
(Petit and Singer, 1985) and have credit ratings for bonds, reducing their information 
asymmetry and allowing them to increase their debt.  
According to the agency theory, the larger the company, the greater the conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders because of the greater separation between ownership 
and control. An increase in the volume of debt could reduce the agency problems. 
Meanwhile, larger companies are generally more diversified, and become bankrupt less 
often, meaning that size is generally seen as a proxy variable for bankruptcy probability 
(Warner, 1977; Smith and Warner, 1979; Ang et al., 1982). Moreover, the relative effect of the 
financial distress costs weighs more heavily on smaller companies. Then, from the 
perspective of the trade-off theory one would expect a positive relationship between size 
and debt level. 
Profitability  
According to the pecking order theory, the most profitable companies use internal finance to a 
greater extent, and reduce the role of external finance (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
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At small firms, the managers are generally the owners and prefer to avoid any source of 
funding which involves the entry of new shareholders. Drawing on this agency argument, 
the most profitable spin-offs prefer to use internally generated resources and, if external 
finance is required, they will choose finance which does not limit their management 
capacity (generally short-term debt which comes with fewer covenants than long-term 
debt). 
The trade-off theory considers the balance between the interest tax shield and the costs of 
possible financial distress that increasing debt would cause. It predicts that the most 
profitable spin-offs borrow less. 
Age  
The pecking order theory predicts that those firms which have been in business longer will 
have lower levels of information asymmetry, and will therefore draw on external financing 
to a greater extent (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Some authors, such as Berger and Udell (1995) 
and Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), hold that the age of the company reflects the 
reputation which it openly communicates to the market. Thus, the study by Hyytinen and 
Pajarinen (2005) focusing on small Finnish TBFs produced similar results to those predicted 
by the pecking order theory.  
However, age may also have a negative impact on the debt level, as longer-established 
companies generally build up a greater volume of internal resources, thereby reducing their 
need to draw on outside sources of funding. Thus, Hogan and Hutson (2005) demonstrates 
that at TBFs which have been in existence for more than ten years, funding through the 
retention of profits takes on a greater role, replacing external finance. 
More mature companies are more likely to have a greater separation between ownership 
and control, thereby increasing the conflict between shareholders and managers. 
Meanwhile, one would expect the conflicts between shareholders and creditors to be 
reduced as a result of the common interest in maintaining the company’s prestige achieved 
in the previous years of operation. Taking into account these agency conflicts, one would 
expect that more mature companies would have a higher debt level, and that their 
repayment terms would be longer. 
More mature companies have other tax deduction mechanisms apart from interest tax 
shields, meaning that according to the trade-off theory one would expect them to have less 
of an interest in increasing their debt for fiscal reasons, and that they would seek to shorten 
the repayment periods on their debt. 
Guarantees  
According to the pecking order theory, tangible assets reduce information asymmetries, as a 
clearer picture is available of the investments made by the company, meaning that their 
assets are not undervalued. 
The conflicts of interest between shareholders and bondholders, such as the moral hazard 
problem, would decrease proportionately to the amount of committed investments already 
in place (De Miguel and Pindado, 2001). The tangible assets provide a greater guarantee for 
creditors, thereby giving easier access to external finance. 
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Tax Aspects  
Finally, from a purely tax-based perspective, we have included two hypotheses in order to 
establish whether the tax system has any influence on the financing decisions made at spin-
offs. Modigliani and Miller (1963) conclude that firms will prefer debt to other financing 
resources due to the tax deductibility of interest payments. Thus, one would expect a 
positive relationship between the effective rate at which USOs are taxed and their debt level. 
According to De Angelo and Masulis (1980), if the firm has other alternative tax shields such 
as depreciation that could substitute the tax advantages of additional debt, they will be less 
inclined to use debt for such purposes. Consequently, an inverse relationship could be 
expected between the non-debt tax shields and the debt level. 
4. Methodology 
4.1 The sample and data 
In our econometric analysis, we have used panel data from the Spanish USOs. The 
population of Spanish USOs was identified using the annual report of the University 
Network of Technology Transfer Offices (2005). At the end of 2005 there were 387 USOs in 
Spain. We first used a survey in order to compile qualitative data through direct contact 
with spin-offs. The survey was administered by mail and addressed to named CEOs or 
Managing Directors using a web-based questionnaire. Completed questionnaires were 
received during January and June 2006. The number of valid returns was 72, giving a 
response rate of just under 19% (Table 2).  
Universe Spanish university spin-offs *  
Sphere Spain 
Sampling procedure Computer assisted survey by means of web-based form 
Rate of response 18.6% 
Sample size 72 spin-offs  
Sample error 10.43% 
Level of confidence 95% 
Fieldwork January 2005 - June 2006 
Notes: * University Network of Technology Transfer Offices (2005). 
Table 2. Technical research sheet 
Secondly, we used SABI database taking into account the annual accounts deposited by 
companies in business registry offices throughout Spain. Therefore, we have constructed an 
unbalanced panel comprising 72 USOs for which the information is available between 1999 
and 2005. 
4.2. Definition of variables 
As no market values are available for privately held USOs, all the variables are book values. 
Table 3 shows the variables employed in the analysis. 
Our dependent variable is book leverage (book_lev). It is measured as the ratio of book value 
of total debt to the book value of the sum of total debt and equity. Total debt covers both 
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long-term debt and current liabilities, the latter including those which do not have an 
explicit cost, as the balance sheets of most spin-offs within the sample did not allow such 
data to be distinguished.  
Nonetheless, an analysis of capital structure based only on total liabilities may screen the 
important differences between long – term and short – term debt (Barclay and Smith, 1999; 
Sogorb-Mira, 2002). In order to provide a more complete view of the capital structure of the 
Spanish USOs, we also consider as dependent variables the following measures of leverage: 
long-term debt ratio (lt_lev) and short-term debt ratio (st_lev).  
 
GROUP VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Dependent 
Variables  
Book leverate (book_lev) Total debt /Total debt and equity 
Long-term debt ratio(lt_lev) Long-term debt / Total debt 
Short-term debt ratio (st_lev) Short-term debt / Total debt 
Independent 
variables 
Growth opportunities 
(%int_assets) 
Intangible assets / Total assets 
Firm size (l_totalassets) Natural log of total assets 
Profitability (ROA) Earnings before interest and taxes / Net 
total assets 
Firm age (more_2) 1 for spin-offs aged more than 2 years, 
and 0 otherwise 
Guarantees (%tang_assets) Tangible assets / Total assets 
Effective tax rate (effec_tax) Taxes / (Earnings after interest and 
before taxes + depreciation) 
Non-debt tax shields 
(ndebt_taxshields) 
Depreciation / Total assets 
Control 
Variables  
Sector 
(booklev_cont, ltlev_cont, 
stlev_cont) 
Deviation in terms of the debt 
(total/long-term/short-term) of each 
spin-off from the annual median for the 
sector 
Table 3. Variables  
The independent variables are the following:  
In order to measure growth opportunities, the proportion of intangible assets was used 
(%int_assets).  
The proxy variable employed for the size of the spin-off was the natural logarithm of its 
total assets (l_totalassets). 
In order to evaluate the profitability, the ratio of EBIT to total assets was used (ROA).  
The firm age was defined as a dummy variable, with a value of 1 for spin-offs aged more 
than 2 years, and 0 otherwise (more_2).  
In order to measure guarantees, the proportion of fixed tangible assets was used 
(%tang_assets).  
Following Sogorb-Mira (2002), the effective tax rate was calculated as the ratio of tax to the 
total pre-tax profit plus depreciation (effec_tax). 
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The non-debt tax shields were calculated as the ratio of depreciation to the total assets 
(ndebt_taxshields). 
Finally, the control variable was the deviation in terms of the debt (total/long-term/short-
term) of each spin-off from the annual median for the sector. The aim of this approach is to 
control industry effects. 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 4 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the estimation.  
 
 Obs. Min. Max. Mean Median S. D. 
book_lev 206 0 0,9988 0,5961 0,6070 0,2724 
st_lev 206 0 0,9794 0,4440 0,4171 0,2767 
lt_lev 206 0 0,8583 0,1521 0,0061 0,2213 
%int_assets 206 0 0,9306 0,1430 0,0512 0,2052 
l_totalassets 206 7,79 16,05 11,63 11,61 1,65 
ROA 206 -0,9720 0,7381 -0,0112 -0,0008 0,2509 
%tang_assets 206 0 0,9477 0,2097 0,1518 0,2172 
effec_tax 203 0 0,9821 0,0751 0 0,1339 
ndebt_taxshields 204 0 0,3515 0,0536 0,0334 0,0640 
stlev_cont 206 -0,3463 0,6387 0,0023 -0,0025 0,1552 
ltlev_cont 206 -0,8453 7862000 201503 1306 733557 
booklev_cont 206 -0,6588 0,2823 -0,0259 0,0048 0,1535 
Table 4. Summary statistics  
Total liabilities on average amount to about 59.6% of total assets value. If we split total 
liabilities into long-term debt and current liabilities, the figures 15.2% and 44.6% 
respectively, show that debt financing for USOs in our sample corresponds mainly to a short 
term nature, exactly 74%. We find that intangible and tangible assets represent over 14% and 
20% of total assets value, respectively. The average ROA over the period of study of the 
USOs in the sample is negative (-1.1%). Finally, the variables which measure the effective tax 
rate and non-tax debt shields have mean values of 7.5% and 5.3% respectively. 
Table 5 shows the correlation matrix. As could be expected, most of the variables that are 
theoretically related to leverage are correlated and present the predicted sign. To determine 
the extent to which multicollinearity was a problem, we calculate the variance inflation 
factor (VIFs) scores. It was found that the VIFs scores did not exceed 2 for all the variables, 
which is not close to the rule of thumb “threshold” value of 10 (Hair et al., 1998). Therefore, 
multicollinearity was not a major problem in the analysis. 
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book_lev 1             
st_lev 0.675*** 1            
lt_lev 0.386*** -0.419*** 1           
%int_assets -0.27*** -0.326*** 0.075 1         1.36 
l_totalassets 0.145** -0.136* 0.349*** 0.324*** 1        1.29 
ROA 0.063 0.142** -0.099 -0.255*** -0.055 1       1.45 
%tang_assets 0.399*** -0.041 0.543*** -0.235*** 0.117* -0.012 1      1.13 
effec_tax 0.008 0.127* -0.149** -0.191*** -0.043 0.507*** -0.049 1     1.37 
ndebt_taxshields 0.058 -0.061 0.150** 0.172** 0.141** -0.149** 0.047 -0.134** 1    1.08 
booklev_cont 0.476*** 0.300*** 0.209*** -0.002 0.221*** -0.137** 0.109 -0.104 0.141** 1   1.69 
ltlev_cont -0.095 -0.050 -0.054 -0.036 -0.184*** 0.184*** -0.109 0.131* 0.038 -0.138** 1  1.10 
stlev_cont 0.361*** 0.398*** -0.053 0.051 0.234*** -0.074 0.071 -0.056 0.094 0.614*** -0.12* 1 1.64 
Notes: ***,**,* denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 5. Correlation matrix 
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
As we explained in Section 2 and bearing in mind that the estimations were carried out with 
panel data, the basic regression that we run can be expressed as:  
Book_ levit 
Lt_ levit 
St_levit 
=+ %int_assetsit+ l_totalassetsit+ ROAit+ more_2it+ %tang_assetsit + 
effec_taxit+ ndebt_taxshieldsit +(booklev_conit/ ltlev_contit /stlev_contit 
)+i+t+it 
(1)
where t is a time-specific effect, i denotes the unobservable individual specific effect that is 
time – invariant, and it is a white noise disturbance. According to Baltagi (2001), the panel 
data methodology presents clear advantages over cross-sectional or time series studies. For 
instance, it can control for firm heterogeneity, and reduce collinearity among the variables 
that are contemplated (Arellano and Bover, 1995).  
A critical question in cross-section models is to identify whether the unobservable 
individual effects are correlated with the independent variable of the model (fixed effects) or 
not correlated (random effects). In order to contrast the correlation between the individual 
effects and the independent variables, both the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) and the 
Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) can be used. 
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 Total debt Long-term debt Short-term debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 R.E. F.E. I.V. R.E. F.E. I.V. R.E. F.E. I.V. 
%int_assets -0.2457***
(-2.97) 
-0.2082**
(-2.07) 
0.1499 
(0.96) 
0.0645 
(0.9) 
0.0368 
(0.4) 
0.5010***
(2.84) 
-0.3434***
(-3.75) 
-0.2884** 
(-2.48) 
-0.2324 
(-1.16) 
l_totalassets 0.01736 
(1.51) 
0.0186 
(1.29) 
0.0261 
(0.95) 
0.0400*** 
(4.09) 
0.0474***
(3.81) 
0.0771** 
(2.26) 
-0.0226* 
(-1.81) 
-0.0134 
(-0.85) 
-0.0766** 
(-2.16) 
ROA 0.0595 
(1.01) 
0.0347 
(0.54) 
-0.1933 
(-0.8) 
-0.0095 
(-0.17) 
0.0013 
(0.02) 
-0.5942**
(-2.14) 
0.0342 
(0.52) 
0.0306 
(0.41) 
0.0737 
(0.22) 
more_2 0.0462 
(1.58) 
0.0411 
(1.29) 
 0.0159 
(0.6) 
0.0487* 
(1.67) 
 0.0648** 
(1.97) 
0.0165 
(0.45) 
 
%tang_assets 0.2322***
(3.12) 
0.0771 
(0.8) 
0.1749 
(0.78) 
0.4731*** 
(7.39) 
0.2536***
(2.93) 
0.1692 
(0.51) 
-0.0974 
(-1.19) 
0.0631 
(0.57) 
-0.1397 
(-0.47) 
effec_tax -0.0734 
(-0.67) 
-0.1167 
(-0.99) 
-0.3346 
(-1.09) 
-0.0616 
(-0.61) 
0.0454 
(0.42) 
0.7399** 
(2.26) 
-0.0003 
(0) 
-0.1128 
(-0.83) 
-0.9839*** 
(-2.71) 
ndebt_taxshi
elds 
-0.1476 
(-0.69) 
-0.2118 
(-0.91) 
0.1567 
(0.58) 
0.1441 
(0.75) 
0.0833 
(0.39) 
0.0313 
(0.1) 
-0.2652 
(-1.1) 
-0.2497 
(-0.93) 
-0.0384 
(-0.11) 
Booklev_cont
/ltlev_cont/ 
stlev_cont 
0.7087 
(8.41) 
0.7195***
(8) 
0.1236 
(0.79) 
0.0000 
(1.08) 
0.0000 
(0.55) 
-0.0000* 
(-1.67) 
0.8481***
(9.69) 
0.8533*** 
(9.44) 
0.4979*** 
(3.96) 
constant 0.3941***
(3.13) 
0.4072** 
(2.5) 
-0.0136 
(-0.61) 
-0.4274*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.4960 
(-3.62) 
-0.0003 
(-0.01) 
0.7570***
(5.63) 
0.6393*** 
(3.67) 
-0.0032 
(-0.12) 
Obs. 203 203 40 203 203 40 203 203 40 
Breusch–
Pagan T1 
49.75 
(0.000) 
  12.36 
(0.000) 
  23.44 
(0.000) 
  
Hausman 
T.2 
 15.86 
(0.0445) 
  92.06 
(0.000) 
  18.60 
(0.0172) 
 
Hausman 
T.3 
  (0.99)   (0.99)   (0.99) 
Regresión-
based T4 
  2.25 
(0.1378) 
  1 
(0.3208) 
  0.05 
(0.8273) 
Notes: ***,**,* denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. t – statistics in 
parentheses. RE Random effects model, FE Fixed effects model, IV Instrumental variables (first 
differences) 
1. The Breush-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test in the random effects model for the null hypothesis 
that there are no individual specific effects. 
2. 2 statistic and p-value for the Hausman test for the null hypothesis that explanatory variables and 
individual effects are uncorrelated.  
3. P-value of the Hausman test comparing IV and OLS estimates. If we accept the null hypothesis, 
then there is no endogeneity. 
4. F statistics and p-value of the regresión-based test proposed by Wooldridge (2002) If we accept the 
null hypothesis, then there is no endogeneity. 
Table 6. Determinants of debt level 
In addition, the profitability variable could lead to problems of endogeneity, which would 
invalidate the consistency of the estimator for fixed effects as a result of the repercussion 
which debt levels could have on this variable. In order to contrast this fact, we corrected the 
proposed models by using instrumental variables and by applying the first difference 
estimator. The most frequent means of instrumenting the variables where problems of 
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endogeneity exist involve replacing exogenous regressors with themselves, and the 
endogenous variable, in this case profitability, with its lags (Hsiao, 2003). We subsequently 
contrast the similarity of the coefficients of the models estimated by instrumental variables 
and by ordinary minimal squares, once again applying the test of Hausman (1978) in 
addition to the test proposed by Wooldridge (2002). 
The results of fixed effects models, random effects models and instrumental variables 
estimators are reported in Table 6. 
The Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis that there are no individual specific 
effects, something which generally occurs in practice (Wooldridge, 2002; Verbeek, 2004). The 
outcome of the Hausman test also enables us to reject the hypothesis of no correlation 
between the individual unobserved characteristics and some explanatory variables and, 
thereby, the choice should be the fixed effects model.  
However, as mentioned above, the profitability variable could present problems of 
endogeneity which would invalidate the consistency of the fixed effects estimator. 
Therefore, given the existence of correlation between the non-observable heterogeneity and 
the explanatory variables (first problem of endogeneity), we corrected the model using 
instrumental variables (IV). We took the second lag as the instrument for the profitability 
variable. 
Then we contrasted the similarity between OLS and IV estimates by means of two tests. The 
regression-based test proposed by Wooldridge (2002) provides low F (1.77) statistics, 
allowing us to accept the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the residuals is equal to 0, 
and hence the exogeneity of the variables. These results are ratified by the Hausman test 
(1978). Since no evidence was found for the existence of problems of endogeneity, we 
concluded that the fixed effect estimation was consistent. The results of the empirical 
analysis ratify some of the outlined hypotheses (Table 7). 
In the analysis of total debt, only the proxy variable for growth opportunities is statistically 
significant. The negative coefficient of the percentage of intangible assets (%int_assets) 
confirms the expected inverse relationship between total debt and growth opportunities. 
Companies with greater growth opportunities are subjected to a higher level of uncertainty 
(pecking order theory), greater under-investment problems (agency theory) and a greater 
probability of financial distress (trade-off theory). These circumstances would explain a limit 
on funding by external investors. 
Although the remaining variables present the signs predicted by the pecking order theory, 
except for profitability and effective tax rate, we did not find a statistically significant 
relationship between these and the book leverage. 
The proposed hypotheses present a closer fit in explaining the levels of long-term debt of the 
spin-offs. In addition, in this case all the significant factors present the expected sign 
according to the pecking order and agency theories.  
We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the size of the USOs and 
their level of long-term debt. This result supports the hypothesis of the pecking order 
theory, according to which larger companies are subjected to lower information 
asymmetries, giving them easier access to external finance. It also confirms the ideas based 
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on the trade-off theory, according to which the costs of bankruptcy have a relatively smaller 
impact on larger-sized companies, and they are therefore less concerned about taking on a 
greater level of debt. In addition, at larger-sized companies a high level of debt can help 
reduce conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
 
 Pecking 
order 
theory 
Agency theory 
Trade-off 
theory 
Results 
book_lev     
Growth 
opportunities 
- - - - 
Firm size + + + Ns 
Profitability - + + Ns 
Firm age + + - Ns 
Guarantees + + - Ns 
Effective  
tax rate 
  + Ns 
Non-debt  
tax shields 
  - Ns 
lt_lev     
Growth 
opportunities 
- - - Ns 
Firm size + + + + 
Profitability - + + Ns 
Firm age + + - + 
Guarantees + + - + 
Effective  
tax rate 
  + Ns 
Non-debt  
tax shields 
  - Ns 
st_lev     
Growth 
opportunities 
+ + + - 
Firm size - - - Ns 
Profitability + - - Ns 
Firm age - - + Ns 
Guarantees - - + Ns 
Effective  
tax rate 
   Ns 
Non-debt  
tax shields 
   Ns 
Note: (+ / -) Positive / negative influence on the debt level. (Ns) No evidence of a relationship was 
found 
Table 7. Hypotheses and results 
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There is also a statistically significant relationship between the firm age and the long-term 
debt ratio; spin-offs aged more than 2 years generally have a higher level of long-term debt. 
This result supports the hypothesis of the pecking order theory, according to which 
companies which have been in operation for a longer time are subjected to less information 
asymmetry. Our results partially coincide with those of Hogan and Hutson (2005), who 
indicate that TBFs aged less than two years generally use internal sources.  
Finally, the positive coefficient of the percentage of tangible assets (%tang_assets) confirms 
the expected relationship between long-term debt ratio and guarantees. This result 
corroborates that the tangible assets can act as collateral, reducing agency conflicts between 
creditors and shareholders, and reduce information asymmetries regarding the value of the 
company's investments, as they are easier to value than intangible assets.  
In the analysis of short-term debt, only the proxy variable for growth opportunities is 
statistically significant (%int_assets). However, the negative sign was contrary to the 
relationship predicted by the financial theories. Normally, the circumstances explaining 
lower debt levels lead SMEs to have recourse to short-term debt as a possible solution for 
funding limits, but the results do not support this hypothesis. In our opinion, the 
considerable weighting which short-term debt has at total debt (74%) lead short-term 
creditors to mistrustful of spin-offs with high proportion of intangible assets, and restrict the 
funding which they make available to them. 
Finally, although the size and profitability variables present the signs predicted by the 
pecking order theory, we do not find a statistically significant relationship between both 
variables and the short-term debt ratio. 
The above results lead us to conclude that both the pecking order theory and the agency 
theory are more appropriate than the trade-off theory in explaining the long-term debt ratio 
of the USOs. We cannot say the same either for book leverage or for short-term debt ratio. 
The fact that aforementioned theories refer to the debt with explicit cost, which was not 
possible to split up from the rest of debt, could explain the lack of significance in the 
estimated coefficients both for total debt and for short-term debt ratios. 
The tax variables are not significant in any model. This result corroborates the opinion of 
some authors according to whom tax aspects do not help explain the capital structure of 
SMEs, and in our case of the spin-offs. 
6. Conclusions  
Society claims University must be a force for fostering regional economic and social 
development. The University’s response has been an increase in the dissemination of 
scientific knowledge and technology transfer activities among other ways by creating 
academic spin-offs. But, recent studies have suggested that spin-offs are not the most useful 
of the available pathways for the transfer of knowledge from universities to industry due to 
slow growth of these firms in various countries. USOs tend to remain relatively small and 
fail to grow; this suggests that large numbers of companies remain struggling with different 
obstacles. These barriers could be related to the market, finance and management, 
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accommodation, regulatory issues, etc. But one of the most important obstacles is the access 
to financial resources, especially after a few years of existence of a spin- off when (small) 
series production facilities are needed or when additional R&D investment is necessary. 
For these reasons, in this paper, we have analyzed the factors that determine the capital 
structure of the spin-offs created by Spanish universities. We have constructed an 
unbalanced panel comprising 72 USOs from 1999 to 2005. We have estimated a variety of 
models that included the main explanatory variables mentioned in theoretical framework 
and earlier empirical studies.  
In our model, growth opportunities are negatively related to debt level. Due to the 
characteristics of the proxy constructed for these growth opportunities, the interpretation is 
that as investors perceive that there is a greater probability of bankruptcy and a greater 
information asymmetry, they demand a higher premium from the USO which discourages 
the use of debt.  
The empirical evidence obtained from the estimation of the models shows that the critical 
factors in setting the long-term debt ratio of a USO are firm size, age and guarantees. The 
positive coefficients for these variables suggest that both the pecking order theory and the 
agency theory are more appropriate than the trade-off theory in explaining the long-term 
debt level of the USOs. 
Finally, growth opportunities are also negatively related to short-term debt level. From our 
point of view, the high weighting which short-term debt has at total debt impedes USOs to 
have recourse to short-term debt as a possible solution for funding restrictions. 
Our findings show a picture where spin-offs has a problematic situation in gaining 
resources. A way for obtaining finance resources, especially long-term debt, is increasing 
size, age and guarantees.  
The results of this paper have implications for the design of public policies that aim at 
supporting USOs. First, our descriptive results of the financial situation of the USOs suggest 
the need to balance the short-term and long-term debt levels. The specific characteristics of 
USOs (technology-intensive small businesses) lead them to rely excessively on short-term 
resources. In this contest, when those companies with the greatest growth have to look for 
funds to finance investment projects, could find themselves strangled by an excess of 
unwanted short-term debt, and are "stifled by their own success". 
Second, the USOs have a high proportion of intangible assets if compared with other SMEs, 
while tangible assets provide collateral for barely one fifth of their liabilities. As a result, 
USOs are often forced to provide additional guarantees due to the high perception of risk on 
the part of creditors. In this contest, public authorities, in partnership with universities, need 
to promote instruments to help USOs guarantee the repayment of the debt. 
Finally, firm size and age have a positive relationship with the level of long-term debt. These 
results suggest the need to create instruments to help USOs not only at the point of 
foundation, but also during the early years of a business's life cycle. USOs very often do not 
have an ended product or technology which can directly be launched onto the market, or 
simply lack the necessary business skills and experience. In this regard, universities can play 
a major role, as they are familiar with the main weaknesses of spin-offs in the period 
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immediately after foundation, although there would be a need for the involvement of other 
types of outside agents with greater experience of the business world (innovation centres 
and technology parks). 
Finally, this paper presents some limitations which could partly explain the lack of 
significance in some variables and open the way for further research. Firstly, the lack of 
significance in some variables may be associated to the sample size. In order to correct this 
problem, financial data could be collected from those USOs which did not respond to our 
survey by extending the sample. Secondly, although we placed the emphasis on the firm 
characteristics highlighted by financial theories, the social and human capital of the 
entrepreneur and the host university have also to be considered in order to explain the 
capital structure of the USOs. Thirdly, due to the size of the USOs in the sample, it was not 
possible to distinguish the debt with explicit cost. These aspects must therefore be taken into 
consideration when interpreting the results. 
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